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INTRODUCTION
An employer is responsible for making numerous decisions involv-
ing the initial hiring of its workforce, as well as subsequent determina-
tions concerning salary, promotion, and transfer, which have a signifi-
cant impact on individuals who work for the firm or apply for
employment. It is therefore important that these decisions are made in
a manner which is reasonable and free from any discriminatory effect.
Often such determinations are made objectively through the use of stan-
dardized procedures, such as aptitude tests, that are neutral in their
content and mechanical in their application. There is a second mode of
decision-making by employers which instead uses a more subjective, in-
dividualized approach. For instance, rather than administering the
same test to each candidate for promotion and selecting the employee
having the highest numerical score, an employer following this second
approach might choose to interview the candidates, with or without the
aid of a defined set of desireable criteria, and form her own opinion of
each candidate's performance and potential. In both selection methods
there lies the possibility of discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 ("Title VII") proscribes
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. The nature of Title VII protection varies, however,
with the nature of the alleged discrimination. Two approaches have
been used by plaintiffs to prove discrimination in employment deci-
sions. Plaintiffs can allege disparate treatment: the employer intended
t B.A., B.B.A. 1987, Southern Methodist University; J.D. Candidate 1990, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.
1 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17
(1982)). The key provisions of Title VII became effective July 2, 1965, one year after
passage of the entire Act. See id. at § 716(a), 78 Stat. 253, 266.
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to treat the employee less favorably because of the employee's member-
ship in a protected class. Alternatively, a plaintiff can allege disparate
impact and argue that a facially neutral and objective employment
practice, such as an aptitude test, has had a statistically significant ad-
verse effect on members of a protected class, and as such is discrimina-
tory absent a legitimate business justification. The circuit courts have
disagreed over the proper approach to subjective decision-making. Yet
whether a subjective practice is regarded as discriminatory depends
largely on whether it is scrutinized under the disparate impact or dis-
parate treatment standard. The differences in these approaches are sub-
stantial, both in terms of their theoretical underpinnings and, more im-
portantly for plaintiffs, in terms of their respective allocation of
evidentiary burdens. The approach which is used will often determine
the outcome of a suit.
The Supreme'Court recently addressed this issue in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust,2 a unanimous decision holding that discre-
tionary decision-making by employers challenged as violating Title VII
should be scrutinized under the disparate impact rather than the dispa-
rate treatment standard; thus, the question should be whether a facially
neutral employment practice has had a statistically significant adverse
effect on members of a minority group. Watson raises new and signifi-
cant questions while failing to answer some old and persistent ones.
This Comment argues that the Court was correct in choosing to apply
disparate impact rather than disparate treatment analysis to subjective
criteria. This decision was weakened, however, by the Court's failure to
adequately justify its choice. This lack of a proper predicate lead the
plurality in Watson to advance a new set of evidentiary burdens which,
instead of strengthening disparate impact theory, would limit sharply
its usefulness to plaintiffs in subjective criteria cases and could collapse
disparate impact into disparate treatment analysis.
This Comment seeks to provide the analytical framework neces-
sary to set this inherently correct ruling on a firm footing and to en-
hance Watson's usefulness as a weapon against employment discrimi-
nation. The two basic approaches to Title VII claims and the unique
issues presented by subjective employment practices are set forth in
Part I. Part II examines the lower courts and Supreme Court Watson
opinions. Part III discusses how subjective employment practices can be
used as a vehicle for discrimination and explains why the disparate
impact standard is a more effective way of policing such discrimination.
Part IV critically examines the plurality's proposed allocation of the
2 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
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evidentiary burdens in subjective criteria cases. Arguing that the plural-
ity's solution results from a failure to comprehend fully the challenges
presented by subjective practices, Part V offers an alternative approach.
I. TITLE VII THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION
Title VII, as amended,' broadly4 proscribes discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.5
Title VII regulates all aspects of the employment relationship and pro-
vides for only limited exceptions.' Plaintiffs can prove employment dis-
crimination in two ways: disparate treatment, which focuses on dis-
criminatory intent, and disparate impact, which seeks to prove that a
facially neutral employment practice has a statistically significant ad-
verse effect on members of a protected class.7 Competing concepts of
equality underlie these two frameworks." Disparate treatment seeks
equality of opportunity and treatment. It emphasizes that race or other
impermissible criteria should not be considered in employment deci-
sions. Although such "color blindness" might help equalize job distri-
bution between races, this result would be fortuitous. Disparate impact,
on the other hand, seeks to attain equality of outcome or achievement.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972) (codified as amendments to and deletions from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17
(1982)).
" The scope of Title VII embraces all employers having fifteen or more employ-
ees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
Title VII provides that:
(a) . . . It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
6 The two most notable exceptions to the general prohibitions of Title VII encom-
pass bona fide occupational qualifications, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982), and
bona fide seniority systems. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
7 For an overview of these approaches, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-10 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1983-85); Corbett, Proving
and Defending Employment Discrimination Claims, 47 MONT. L. REV. 217, 217-62
(1986).
8 See, e.g., Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial
Justice, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 10-26 (discussing the conflicting models of "individual"
and "group" justice); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
235, 237-40 (1971) (discussing the different conceptions of equality that underlie em-
ployment discrimination laws).
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The goal is not simply to compensate individual victims of specific acts
of intentional discrimination, but rather to remedy the class-wide effects
of racial injustice. Title VII plaintiffs may base their claim on either or
both approaches and courts may apply one or the other in deciding a
case.9 As the following discussion will demonstrate, marked differences
in the proof requirements under each theory mean that the approach a
court adopts can significantly affect the outcome of a Title VII suit.
A. The Disparate Treatment Model
The central issue in a disparate treatment case is whether the em-
ployer intended to treat an employee less favorably because of her race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,'0 the Supreme Court set forth the requirements for establishing
a prima facie claim of disparate treatment:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial
burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of
racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that
he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications. 1
Establishing a prima facie case is sufficient to create a rebuttable pre-
sumption of unlawful discrimination against the employer. The em-
ployer must respond by "producing evidence that the plaintiff was re-
jected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason."' 2 If the employer is successful, the pre-
9 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
10 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, a former employee who was a
black civil rights activist sought reemployment after being laid off as a result of a gen-
eral reduction in the work force. He alleged that he had been denied reemployment
because of both his involvement in civil rights activities and his minority status. His
former employer maintained that the plaintiff had not been rehired because he had
engaged in unlawful activities against the firm in the process of protesting both his
discharge and the firm's general hiring policies. See id. at 794-96.
"1 Id. at 802. The Court noted, however, that this standard is flexible, as "[t]he
facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima
facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
2 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The
Court recognized that limiting the defendant's burden to one of mere production will
not unduly hinder the plaintiff because: (1) the defendant's explanation of its legitimate
[Vol. 137:1755
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sumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case is rebutted
and the plaintiff, who retains the burden of persuasion throughout the
case,13 now has the opportunity to demonstrate through independent
evidence that the employer's proffered reason was not the true reason
for the employment decision, but was a mere pretext for an underlying
discriminatory motive.1 4 This may be accomplished "either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.'
5
B. The Disparate Impact Model
Disparate impact occurs when facially neutral employment deci-
sion-making has a statistically significant and unjustifiable adverse ef-
fect on members of a protected class. Although such practices or criteria
are not intentionally discriminatory, they perpetuate the effects of dis-
crimination and are therefore invalid under Title VII. Disparate im-
pact analysis was first authorized by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 6 which extended Title VII to practices which are
"fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."'" In holding that the
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discrimination, Chief
Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, declared that "good
intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds'
for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."'
8
reason must be clear and reasonably specific, therefore affording the plaintiff a "full
and fair opportunity" for rebuttal; (2) the defendant retains an incentive, although not
a legal burden, to persuade the fact finder that the employment decision was valid, and
in pursuit of this will provide the factual basis for its explanation; (3) liberal discovery
rules and access to EEOC investigatory files will provide plaintiff with sufficient infor-
mation to respond to the proffered reason. See id. at 258.
13 See id. at 253.
14 See id. at 256. In McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807, the Court ultimately
found that the employer had satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate reason for
its refusal to hire, but remanded the action so as to afford the former employee an
opportunity to demonstrate that this explanation was pretextual.
1" Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
16 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, black employees of a power plant challenged
the employer's requirement that, as a condition of employment or transfer, employees
either possess a high school diploma or obtain satisfactory scores on two standardized
intelligence tests. The employees claimed that neither requirement was significantly
related to job performance, both requirements operated disproportionately against
blacks, and the jobs in question formerly had been filled only by whites as part of a
long standing practice of giving preferential treatment to whites. There was no showing
that the employer's requirements were intentionally discriminatory. See id. at 428.
17 Id. at 431.
18 Id. at 432.
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Proof of racial motive was not required because "Congress directed the
thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not sim-
ply the motivation."
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under disparate
impact, a plaintiff must show that the facially neutral criterion in ques-
tion results in the hiring or promotion of applicants in a "significantly
discriminatory pattern."20 The Supreme Court has approved three
types of statistical comparisons for assessing the impact of an em-
ployer's practice on a protected group.2' "General population statistics"
can be used to compare in a relevant geographic area the percentage of
protected class members adversely affected by the employer's practice
with the percentage of non-protected individuals similarly affected.
Such data commonly are used when, due to a lack of specialized em-
ployment requirements, most of the population at large would be suffi-
ciently qualified.22 "Applicant flow data" compares the minority com-
position of the pool of individuals applying for a job or promotion with
the composition of those actually hired or promoted by the employer.
Finally, the "available workforce statistic" compares the percentage of
a protected class in the relevant labor market, defined as those individu-
als having the requisite skills for the job, with the percentage of that
class in the employer's workforce. Which statistical population is used
for comparison can determine whether or not a significant statistical
disparity is shown.
To defend against such a showing, the employer must meet its
burden of proving that the practice has a manifest relationship to the
1'9 Id. He added that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430.
20 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
21 See generally Norris, Statistical Proof and Theories of Discrimination, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1986); Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 45, 69-86 (1979) (showing how the Supreme Court has accepted "general
population," "available workforce," and "Applicant Flow and Internal" statistics as
indicators of adverse impact).
22 For example, in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977),
the Court indicated that general population statistics had been appropriate in Team-
sters "because the job skill there involved-the ability to drive a truck-is one that
many persons possess or can fairly readily acquire. When special qualifications are
required to fill particular jobs, [these statistics] may have little probative value." Id. at
308 n.13. Some commentators object to the use of general population data. See, e.g.,
Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality, 1979
SUP. CT. REV. 17, 31-34, 38-39 (general population statistics are rarely in accord with
the pool of qualified applicants because most jobs require qualifications not possessed
by all adults; such statistics are never appropriate in Title VII cases).
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employment at issue; in effect, that its use was a business necessity. 23
An employer may continue to use a criterion which has an adverse
impact, regardless of its magnitude, on members of a protected group if
that criterion is sufficiently job-related.24 Although the precise contours
of this burden have been the subject of much debate, the courts clearly
place upon the employer the burden of proving, not merely explaining,
that a particular practice is warranted on the basis of business need.
The plaintiff, however, may challenge this business necessity defense
25
by showing that a less restrictive alternative is available that would
meet the employer's legitimate needs and yet have less, if any, detri-
mental impact on minority group members.28
The Court has applied disparate impact to measure the effect of
each component of a selection system, even if the impact of the overall
system is not racially disproportionate. Thus, an employer cannot de-
fend a showing of adverse impact by claiming the employment process
as a whole does not operate in a discriminatory manner; a racially bal-
anced "bottom line" will not suffice.2 Aside from this refinement, how-
ever, the scope of disparate impact analysis has remained uncertain.
21 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
2 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) ("[D]is-
criminatory tests are impermissible unless shown . . . to be 'predictive of or signifi-
cantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or-are rele-
vant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.'" (quoting Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(0) (1985) [hereinafter Uniform Guidelines])); see also
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 103-07 (same).
25 One prominent commentator disputes the three-part procedure employed in
evaluating traditional disparate impact claims, alleging that there is only one step in the
analysis.
The employer's "defense" is actually a rebuttal of the plaintiffs' prima
facie case, and the plaintiffs' attack on the "defense" is merely a further
refinement of the prima facie case. In the end, the only question in adverse
impact cases is whether an employment practice selects blacks and whites
in numbers reasonably proportionate to the representations of the races in
the available work force.
Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse
Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform,
7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 433 (1985).
11 See, e.g., Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (plaintiff may "show that other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the em-
ployer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.'" (quoting Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
27 See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982). The plaintiffs in Teal chal-
lenged Connecticut's promotion scheme for welfare supervisors which required that ap-
plicants first pass a written test. Statistics showed that more blacks than whites failed
the test, but that actual promotions were awarded to blacks much more often than to
whites. See id. at 444. The Court concluded that the employee's claim of discrimination
should be analyzed under disparate impact and rejected the employer's asserted "bot-
tom line" defense. See id. at 456.
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Until recently,2" Supreme Court decisions applying disparate impact
involved objective or non-discretionary selection devices which were dis-
crete and facially neutral.2" These decisions provided little guidance to
lower federal courts asked to analyze an increasingly wide range of
subjective employment practices under the disparate impact theory. 0
C. Disparate Impact and Subjective Criteria: Defining the Issue
Courts have been reluctant to distinguish between "subjective" and
"objective" employment criteria. 1 The distinction, however, should not
be dismissed lightly, as some courts and commentators tend to do,32
28 See infra notes 43-100 and accompanying text.
29 The types of selection devices examined by the Court thus far include standard-
ized intelligence tests (Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426; Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 409; Teal, 457
U.S. at 443), diploma requirements (Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425), minimum height and
weight requirements (Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1977)), and rules
against the employment of drug users (New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568 (1979)). Cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
(1977) (applying disparate treatment in a Title VII challenge to uses of subjective prac-
tices in hiring and promotion); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
310-12 (1977) (same).
In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 569 (1978), the Court declined
to apply disparate impact analysis to a "grapevine" hiring system under which defend-
ant's supervisor hired workers from a list of those whom he knew possessed the re-
quired skills for the position. In a controversial, albeit cryptic, footnote the Court stated
that "[t]his case did not involve employment tests, which we dealt with in [Griggs] and
in [Albemarle], or particularized requirements such as the height and weight specifica-
tions considered in [Dothard], and it was not a 'pattern or practice' case like [Team-
sters]." Id. at 575 n.7 (citations omitted). This has been interpreted by some as a limi-
tation on the type of employment practices to which disparate impact analysis is
appropriately applied, namely those which the Court has scrutinized already. See, 'e.g.,
3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 76.32, at 15-85 (1986
& Supp. 1988) (citing the impossibility of validation and the conceptual distinction
between disparate impact and disparate treatment as reasons for limiting impact analy-
sis to objective procedures). For the most part, however, this offhand statement has
been ignored by lower courts, as is shown by their application of disparate impact to
practices supposedly outside this sphere. See infra note 32; see also Furnco, 438 U.S.
at 583-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20 See Comment, Applying Disparate Impact Theory to Subjective Employee Se-
lection Procedures, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 375, 376 n.8 (1987) (describing the stagger-
ing volume of Title VII complaints-approximately fifty-four thousand in 1983 alone).
21 See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. 424; Albemarle, 422 U.S. 405; Dothard, 433 U.S.
321; Teal, 457 U.S. 440; see also Rigler, Title VII and the Applicability of Disparate
Impact Analysis to Subjective Selection Criteria, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 33 (1985)
("Each decision has employed a method reminiscent of Justice Stewart's memorable
concurrence regarding pornography: 'I know it when I see it.' "). Certainly a pragmatic
reason for concluding that disparate impact applies to subjective as well as objective
criteria is that doing so avoids the task of investigating the differences between them.
See id. at 45.
"2 See, e.g., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1485 (9th Cir.
1987) ("[W]e think a distinction between subjective and objective serves no legitimate
purpose. . . ."), cert. granted in part, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988); Rigler, supra note 31,
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since it is at the heart of a proper understanding of how these respec-
tive criteria are to be scrutinized under Title VII.
Objective criteria typically include examinations, education re-
quirements, work experience, or licensing requirements. Such criteria
are neutral, are applied mechanically and without exception to all ap-
plicants, and leave little or no room for the use of discretion. 3 The ease
with which the consequences of objective criteria can be expressed sta-
tistically makes them particularly amenable to disparate impact
analysis.
By contrast, subjective34 criteria allow for the use of discretion by
the decisionmaker.3 5 An employer making a subjective decision will
draw on her perspectives, beliefs, experience, and judgment. Discretion-
ary criteria are standardless in the sense that there is no identifiable
external standard by which they can be measured. Consequently, the
application of subjective devices is characterized by a lack of
uniformity.
There are many kinds of subjective selection devices. The most
common include interviews, performance appraisals not based on
"hard" data such as quantifiable attendance or production records,
nepotism, and the use of "grapevine" hiring or promotion systems
which selectively announce job openings. Such devices are used most
commonly in the making of promotion and termination decisions rather
than at the initial hiring stage because at these later stages there is
more information on which a subjective decision can be based."6 A se-
at 27 ("[T]here is no logical reason for distinguishing between subjective and objective
criteria. The heart of disparate impact analysis under Title VII is facial neutrality
"Objective" is defined as "expressing or involving the use of facts without dis-
tortion by personal feelings or prejudices." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1556 (1981).
" "Subjective" is defined as "peculiar to a particular individual modified by indi-
vidual bias and limitations; personal." Id. at 2275-76.
"5 See Uniform Guidelines, supra note 24, § 1607.6(b)(1) (referring to subjective
criteria as "informal or unscored" procedures); Waintroob, supra note 21, at 48 (sub-
jective procedures are those in which "judgment or discretion [is exercised] on the part
of the evaluator"). For a general discussion of the characteristics of subjective employ-
ment practices, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 191-205.
36 For an excellent discussion of the definition and use of subjective criteria, see
Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1, 17-23 (1987). In particular, Blumrosen identifies an increase in the
use of subjective criteria and attributes this to five factors: (1) the Supreme Court's
decision in Griggs; (2) the declining adherence to the older theory of "scientific man-
agement" which defined jobs in terms of repetitive performance of limited functions; (3)
the shift from "smoke stack to service industries" and from blue collar to white collar
work, both of which require developed interpersonal skills and other intangible abili-
ties; (4) the existence of "upper tier" jobs which require the employee to engage in
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty; (5) the increase in reorganizations,
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lection system that uses a mix of objective and subjective criteria 7 will
likely be considered subjective, as will a system that relies exclusively
on objective factors but neglects to assign weights to the various
factors. 8
Prior to Watson, the characterization of a selection system as ei-
ther objective or subjective was significant since courts differed as to
which theory of discrimination should be applied to subjective employ-
ment decisions. The Fifth Circuit's use of disparate impact analysis in
Rowe v. General Motors Corp. 9 was followed for nearly a decade.4
This consistency, however, was disrupted in the early 1980s when the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits scrutinized discretionary employment prac-
tices under disparate treatment.4 ' Since this initial disagreement, the
Federal Courts of Appeals have continued to differ as to whether dispa-
rate impact analysis is properly applied to subjective employment crite-
ria.42 This issue finally was resolved by the Supreme Court in Watson.
mergers, and acquisitions which has placed pressures on managers to pay closer atten-
tion to the quality of the employees they select, causing them to favor those whose
background is similar to their own. See id. To this list, a sixth factor may be added: the
costly and time consuming process of validation which objective employment practices
must undergo in order to withstand Title VII challenges have caused employers to rely
more heavily on subjective criteria. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 25, at 587 (the cost of
developing job related criteria may exceed the benefits in using them); Lerner, supra
note 22, at 18 & n.6 (noting that scientific validation is expensive, time-consuming, and
difficult).
" A typical system, such as that at issue in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 427-28 (1971), may require that applicants possess a high school diploma, take a
standardized aptitude test and be interviewed by a member of the personnel department
or the manager of the department in which the applicant seeks to work.
38 See Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 1982);
Blumrosen, supra note 36, at 23-24.
39 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
40 See James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d
511, 528-30 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Stewart v. General Motors
Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 450-51 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1976), reh'g de-
nied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 928
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
,' In Heagney v. University of Washington, 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981),
the Ninth Circuit held that the university's practice of categorizing non-academic em-
ployees as either "classified" or "exempt" was not an objective practice. Consequently,
disparate impact analysis was held to be inappropriate because subjective employment
practices must be shown to be intentionally discriminatory under disparate treatment.
Similarly, in Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982), the
Fifth Circuit refused to allow a disparate impact challenge to the cumulative effects of a
promotion scheme composed of both subjective and objective elements.
"' The Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits have applied disparate impact analysis to subjective systems. See, e.g., Atonio
v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert.
granted in part, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988); Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500, 503 (10th
Cir. 1985); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1522-26 (11th Cir. 1985); Maddox v.
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II. THE Watson Decision
A. The District Court's Disparate Treatment Analysis
In Watson, the Court was presented with a typical selective judg-
ment case under Title VII. The plaintiff, Clara Watson, was a black
employee of Fort Worth Bank & Trust (the "Bank") who had applied,
and been turned down, for a number of promotions.43 In her class ac-
Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1985); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1266,
1270-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); Zahorik v. Cornell
Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1984); Lasso v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins.
Co., 741 F.2d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); East-
land v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 619-20 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1066 (1984); Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667, 672-74 (3d Cir.
1983); Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 481-82 (9th Cir. 1983);
Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88, 93-95 (6th Cir. 1982); Hung Ping
Wang, 694 F.2d at 1147-48; Williams v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist., 641 F.2d 835,
842 (10th Cir. 1981); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1016 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
The Fifth Circuit has analyzed subjective practices under disparate treatment. See,
e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 797-98 (5th Cir. 1986),
vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988); Walls v. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 730
F.2d 306, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1984); Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 699
F.2d 760, 765 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
The Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits are split internally. Compare EEOC v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 1983) (using disparate impact to
scrutinize subjective criteria), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Cooper v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984) and Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th
Cir. 1982) (same) with Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377,
1382 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972) (focusing on practices and general
policies instead of disparate impact analysis); compare Regner v. City of Chicago, 789
F.2d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 1986) (allowing a disparate impact claim despite the existence
of subjective elements) and Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921, 926-27 (7th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 873 (1982) with Griffin v. Board of Regents of Regency
Univ., 795 F.2d 1281, 1288 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying a disparate impact claim because
plaintiffs could not identify a neutral criterion); compare EEOC v. Rath Packing Co.,
787 F.2d 318, 327-28 (8th Cir.) (applying disparate impact analysis to subjective crite-
ria), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 307 (1986) and Hutto v. Jones, 763 F.2d 979, 983-84
(8th Cir.) (same), vacated, 474 U.S. 916 (1985) with Talley v. United States Postal
Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 506-08 (8th Cir.) (refusing to apply disparate impact analysis
unless there exists some facially neutral practice), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952 (1984)
and Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1132 n.6 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 969 (1981).
The First Circuit has not yet been faced with the issue. See Latinos Unidos de
Chelsea en Accion v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 786 (1st Cir.
1986) ("We again find it unnecessary to decide whether the disparate impact model
ever may be used in a case involving subjective criteria."); Robinson v. Polaroid Corp.,
732 F.2d 1010, 1014 (1st Cir. 1984)(same).
"I See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988). Hired in
1973 as a proof operator, Watson was promoted subsequently to teller in the Bank's
motor bank, and then in 1980 to commercial teller in the Bank's main lobby. On four
separate occasions during the following year, Watson was turned down for promotions
to supervisory positions. First, she sought the position of teller supervisor; the position
was awarded, however, to a white male. She then applied to be motor bank teller
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tion, Watson alleged that the Bank had discriminated unlawfully
against her and other blacks in hiring, initial placement, compensation,
promotion, termination, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.44 She relied on both the disparate impact and disparate treatment
theories.
45
The Bank relied exclusively on its white supervisors to make hir-
ing and promotion decisions in their respective departments."6 No writ-
ten criteria were used by these supervisors in evaluating employees for
hiring or promotion purposes. Instead, employees were given supervi-
sory ratings based on twelve factors: accuracy of work, alertness, per-
sonal appearance, relations with supervisors and co-workers, quantity
of work, physical fitness, attendance, dependability, stability, drive,
friendliness and courtesy, and job knowledge.' The resulting score was
combined with "other factors" deemed appropriate by the supervisor
and then used to select candidates for promotion.48
The district court found, using disparate treatment analysis, that
the Bank had not violated Title VII.49 The court analyzed Watson's
individual claim under the McDonnell Douglas50 and Burdine51 dispa-
rate treatment model.52 Watson succeeded in establishing a prima facie
supervisor, but the job was given to a white female. Later, Watson again sought to
become supervisor of the lobby tellers, but was rejected a third time in favor of a white
female. Finally, when the position of supervisor of the motor bank tellers again became
vacant, Watson applied but was rejected in favor of a white male teller. Watson subse-
quently resigned in August of 1981. See id. at 2782. When Watson filed suit, the Bank
had almost eighty employees; it had never employed a black supervisor, director or
bank officer. See Watson, 798 F.2d at 808 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Watson demon-
strated that she had been with the Bank longer than two of the white employees se-
lected over her for promotions and that she possessed more supervisory experience than
another successful candidate. See id. at 793 & n.1, 794 nn.1 & 2.
44 See id. at 794, 797.
45 See id. at 806 n.12 ("Watson advances both her individual and class claims
under a theory of disparate treatment . . ... "). When Watson's initial disparate treat-
ment claims were denied, she turned to impact analysis. See Brief for Petitioner at 8,
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988) (No. 86-6139).
4 See Watson, 798 F.2d at 805-06. Although a senior vice president had final
authority over all personnel matters, as a general rule he deferred to the supervisors'
judgment. Also, although a committee was charged with approving all salary increases,
those increases were based on the results of supervisory performance evaluations, and
these results rarely were disturbed. See id.
4 See id. at 812 n.26 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
'8 See id. at 811-13 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
'8 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, No. 4-81-581-E, slip op. at 9, 14
(N.D.Tex. Nov. 21, 1984) [hereinafter Watson slip op.].
5' McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 292 (1973); see supra notes 10-
15 and accompanying text.
5' Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); see supra
notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
2 See Watson slip op., supra note 49, at 195-96.
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case of discrimination;53 nevertheless, the district court found persuasive
the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons asserted by the Bank for
each disputed promotion." Since Watson failed to demonstrate that the
reasons proffered by the Bank were a mere pretext for discriminatory
conduct, the district court ultimately held that Watson had not been the
victim of intentional discrimination.55
With regard to the claims of the applicant class, the court found
that the statistical evidence provided by Watson failed to establish a
prima facie pattern and practice of discriminatory hiring.56 In so find-
ing, the court relied on general population figures indicating that blacks
represented 13.1 percent of the defendant's workforce, which compared
to 10.2 percent of the population in the Fort Worth metropolitan area
and 11.8 percent of the Tarrant County population.
57
The district court failed to articulate its rationale for preferring
general population statistics to the applicant flow data presented by
Watson, which showed that only a small proportion of blacks who ap-
plied were actually hired by the Bank. During a four-year period, 4.2
percent of blacks who applied were offered positions, as opposed to
16.7 percent of whites.58 In addition, in a period covering four annual
evaluations, black employees scored an average of eleven to fifteen
points lower than their non-black co-workers59 and black employees
were paid $45.98 per month less than similarly situated co-workers.60
These disparities in hiring, evaluation, and compensation were statisti-
cally significant.61
Following affirmation by the Fifth Circuit of the ruling on plain-
tiff's individual claim of discrimination,62 the Supreme Court granted a
53 See id. at 196.
" Such reasons included excellent performance ratings, a high level of education
and the ability to get along with fellow workers. See id. at 196-97.
See id. at 197.
5 See id. at 15.
5 See id.
58 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 810-11 (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting).
" See id. at 812-13 & n.27 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
'o See id. at 813 & n.30 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 810 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that "two or three stan-
dard deviations constitutes sufficient statistical proof").
6 A divided Fifth Circuit declined to apply disparate impact analysis to the
Bank's subjective promotion process. See id. at 797. While the court said it would have
applied disparate impact if the matter had been one of first impression, the panel noted
that it was required by its earlier decision in Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d
795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982), to apply disparate treatment analysis to the plaintiff's claims.
See Watson, 798 F.2d at 797 n.12. The Fifth Circuit also remanded the action for
dismissal of the applicant class claims without prejudice. See id. at 799.
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writ of certiorari6" to resolve a long-standing division among the cir-
cuits by determining whether disparate impact analysis may be applied
to subjective employment practices.
B. The Supreme Court's Disparate Impact Analysis
In a unanimous decision,64 the Supreme Court held that subjective
selection practices challenged as violating Title VII may be subject to
disparate impact analysis.65 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, recognized at the outset that despite the substantially differ-
ent evidentiary standards employed, disparate treatment and disparate
impact are united in serving a common purpose:
The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typi-
cally dominate in disparate impact cases do not imply that
the ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where dis-
parate treatment analysis is used. . . . Rather, the necessary
premise of the disparate impact approach is that some em-
ployment practices, adopted without a deliberately discrimi-
natory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to
intentional discrimination. 6
Given this starting point, the Court furnished two principle ratio-
nales for its decision. First, the Court was persuaded that if disparate
impact analysis was confined to objective decision-making, its landmark
decision in Griggs67 would "become a dead letter."6 8 To avoid the un-
favorable evidentiary requirements imposed by disparate impact, an
employer simply could introduce a single subjective component into its
decision-making process since, as the Court noted, "[h]owever one
might distinguish 'subjective' from 'objective' criteria, it is apparent that
selection systems that combine both types would generally have to be
considered subjective in nature."' 9 Such an incentive would contravene
the purposes of Title VII.7 0 Employers could give subjective criteria
63 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987).
Justice Anthony Kennedy did not participate in the consideration or decision.
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2777, 2791 (1988).
" See id. at 2787. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's ruling and remanded the
action to the district court to determine whether plaintiff's statistical evidence was suffi-
cient to make out a prima facie case under disparate impact theory. See id. at 2791.
66 Id. at 2785 (citation omitted).
67 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also supra notes 16-19
and accompanying text (discussing the Court's first authorization of disparate impact
analysis).
68 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
69 Id.
70 See Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (11th Cir. 1985) (using the "im-
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substantial but not absolute weight, and so avoid the strictures of dispa-
rate impact.71 Discriminatory intent could be more easily masked
thereby, 7  and more difficult for a plaintiff to establish. 73 To circum-
vent this "stark and uninviting" alternative,74 the Court extended dis-
parate impact to subjective employment practices.
As a second justification, Justice O'Connor emphasized that ap-
plying disparate impact to subjective decisions was warranted because
the same factors which pointed to its use in objective cases were also
persuasive in subjective cases.75  Neutral employment prac-
tices-whether subjective or objective-can have a discriminatory ef-
fect7 '6 and are therefore equivalent to practices that are facially discrim-
proper incentive" rationale to justify applying disparate impact analysis to a largely
subjective promotion system).
71 See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 36, at 17-20 (identifying an increase in the use
of subjective criteria and suggesting this was partly due to employers attempting to
avoid the disparate impact analysis of objective criteria authorized by Griggs).
712 See Comment, Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment Criteria Under
Title VII, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 970 (1987) (recognizing that if disparate impact is
limited to objective employment practices, "[tihose employers intending to discriminate
can do so more easily, while even those without bad intentions will tend to shy away
from objective criteria whose impact might later be attacked").
11 See Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786 ("If we announced a rule that allowed employ-
ers so easily to insulate themselves from liability under Griggs, disparate impact analy-
sis might effectively be abolished."); infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
7" Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
71 "We are also persuaded that disparate impact analysis is in principle no less
applicable to subjective employment criteria than to objective or standardized tests." Id.
at 2786. This "equivalence" theme occurred throughout Justice O'Connor's opinion.
See also D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION § 1.23
(Supp. 1987).
[I]n terms of the goal of adverse impact doctrine, there is no basis for
distinguishing between the effects of objective and subjective selection cri-
teria. First, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between "objective" and
"subjective" selection criteria. But more importantly, in terms of their po-
tential adverse impact on employment opportunities for minorities and
women, there is no principled basis for distinguishing between the two
types of criteria.
Id.
7'8 According to the Court, a facially neutral practice may have effects which are
"indistinguishable from intentionally discriminatory practices." Watson, 108 S. Ct. at
2786 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor seems to have set up a dichotomy between
unintentional discriminatory acts, whether accomplished via subjective or objective se-
lection devices, that should be scrutinized under disparate impact, and acts of inten-
tional discrimination subject to disparate treatment. The Court thereby implies without
justification that subjective criteria should be within the scope of Griggs because they
can be used as a vehicle for unintentional discrimination. Unfortunately, by repeatedly
emphasizing that Title VII's proscription applies not only to intentional discrimination,
but also to neutral acts having the same effect, Justice O'Connor failed adequately to
explain how subjective devices are different and why disparate treatment analysis is not
an effective way of policing their use. See infra notes 94-135 and accompanying text.
By lumping together subjective and objective criteria, the Court has avoided the heart of
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inatory. Although discretionary decision-making is not per se unlawful
discrimination," some supervisors in fact act may with discriminatory
intent. Even more importantly for the Court, subjective decision-mak-
ing can facilitate discrimination by providing an outlet for subconscious
racial stereotypes and prejudices.78 The Court thus seems implicitly to
have acknowledged that the chief threat posed by subjective employ-
ment practices is that they can be a vehicle for unintentional discrimi-
nation. Characterizing subjective practices this way requires that they
be scrutinized using disparate impact analysis.
C. The Allocation of Evidentiary Burdens
Having applied disparate impact analysis to subjective decision-
making, Justice O'Connor, now supported only by a plurality consist-
ing of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, ad-
dressed the evidentiary standards that should apply in such cases.
8 0 Of
primary concern to the plurality was whether extending disparate im-
pact analysis to subjective criteria would induce employers to adopt
quotas in selection and promotion decisions."1 Disparate impact permits
the debate: whether and, more importantly, why the disparate impact approach should
be applied to subjective employment practices.
According to the Court,
[An employer's policy of leaving promotion decisions to the unchecked
discretion of lower level supervisors should itself raise no inference of dis-
criminatory conduct. Especially in relatively small businesses like respon-
dent's, it may be customary and quite reasonable simply to delegate em-
ployment decisions to those employees who are most familiar with the jobs
to be filled and with the candidates for those jobs.
Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
7' The sole support provided by Justice O'Connor for this assertion was an exam-
ple from Watson. When she first applied for the teller position, Watson was told that
the job was a big responsibility, and that there would be "'a lot of money . . . for
blacks to have to count.'" Id. at 2786 (quoting Joint Appendix at 7, Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988) (No. 86-6139)). This statement however,
could be regarded as a clear-cut instance of intentional, rather than unintentional, dis-
crimination. It is reminiscent of the evidence presented by plaintiffs in decisions such as
Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885, 889 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 1973)
(statements by supervisor that "colored folks were hired to clean because they cleaned
better" and "colored folks should stay in their place" were direct evidence of discrimi-
natory intent), aff'd and remanded, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
11 See Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786 ("Such remarks may not prove discriminatory
intent, but they do suggest a lingering form of the problem that Title VII was enacted
to combat."). Whether intentional or unintentional, discrimination has the same effect
on the individual employee and it is this effect that Title VII is designed to obviate.
80 See id. at 2787-91.
81 See id.; see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 463 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("[The result of forcing] employers either to eliminate tests or rely on ex-
pensive, job-related testing procedures, the validity of which may or may not be sus-
tained if challenged, . . . may well be the adoption of simple quota hiring."); Gold,
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the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case with statistical evidence.
The employer then must persuade the court that either the disparity
does not exist or that it is due to the use of a criterion justified by
business necessity.82 Although this rebuttal burden may be met easily
when the criteria are objective since standardized tests, for example,
may be validated without undue difficulty,83 the situation becomes more
onerous for an employer when subjective criteria are at issue.8 Since
validation is too impractical, too costly, and too time-consuming, the
argument runs, employers will institute quotas in order to prevent a
plaintiff from using employment decision statistics to establish a prima
facie case.8 The plurality sympathized with employers, acknowledging
supra note 25, at 587-88 (arguing that adverse impact has encouraged employers to
resort to quota hiring in an effort to avoid liability).
82 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
83 See Uniform Guidelines, supra note 24, §§ 1607.5 to -.9, 1607.14 (providing a
rather elaborate framework for validation); see also Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440
U.S. 301, 305-06 & n.4 (1979) (discussing the empirical method of validation by which
employers can demonstrate a correlation between test scores and job performance); Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975) ("job relatedness" will
validate standardized tests); Waintroob, supra note 21, at 62-63 (stating that in the
white collar context, employers easily have shown the validity of standardized tests).
But see Gold, supra note 25, at 459 (stating that "few existing tests can be validated
against the standards in the EEOC Guidelines").
8' The ease with which subjective devices may be validated is a question which
has sparked much debate. Compare Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII:
An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1330 (1987) (defendants
have little "realistic prospect of validating subjective selection procedures with adverse
impact") and Note, Evaluation of Subjective Selection Systems in Title VII Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases: A Misuse of Disparate Impact Analysis, 7 CARDOZO L.
REV. 549, 578 (1986) (in order for employers to validate subjective hiring systems, they
must '"justify each and every qualification as a business necessity") with Atonio v.
Ward's Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that
imposing upon the employer the burden of proving the business necessity of a subjective
practice was not unduly onerous because such a burden was commensurate with the
plaintiff's task in proving her prima facie case; furthermore, the employer, rather than
the plaintiff, was in a unique position as the party most knowledgeable concerning the
purposes and effects of its selection practices), cert. granted in part, 108 S. Ct. 2896
(1988) and Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner by the American Psycho-
logical Association at 2, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988)
(No. 86-6139) ("Subjective selection devices can be scientifically validated for the as-
sessment of individuals for hiring, promotion, or other selection decisions in the em-
ployment context.") and Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Se-
lection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. REV.
1, 34-36 (1977) (suggesting that employers can validate their systems by showing
favorable hiring data and application flow data).
8" The plurality sided with those who argue that it is difficult to validate subjec-
tive criteria. Subjective criteria are necessary since many jobs require qualities or skills
which cannot be measured objectively. Whether an employee so selected has been an
employment success cannot be determined directly, so neither can the predictive validity
of the subjective criteria. Thus, subjective selection criteria are "impossible to elimi-
nate" and "impossibly expensive to defend." Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787. But see
Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1486 (holding that imposing upon the employer the burden of
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that the Bank was "correct when [it] argue[d] that extending disparate
impact analysis to subjective employment practices has the potential to
create a Hobson's choice for employers and thus to lead in practice to
perverse results.""6
Extending disparate impact also raises the fear of broad "cumula-
tive effects" challenges to complex employee selection systems. Most
employers evaluate applicants on the basis of mixed subjective and ob-
jective criteria.87 A plaintiff bringing a Title VII suit under disparate
impact would allege a statistically significant disparity, broadly con-
tending that the employer's hiring system as a whole is discriminatory.
An employer relying on mixed criteria thus would have to isolate and
justify each criterion, comparing its effect on the plaintiff with its effect
on the protected group as a whole.88 Given the potential problems with
validating subjective criteria,89 this could be a particularly difficult task
to complete.
Justice O'Connor responded to these fears by articulating two evi-
dentiary safeguards.90 The first of these relates to the nature of the
plaintiff's prima facie case, addressing the problems posed by broad-
based attacks on an employer's selection system. Justice O'Connor held
that when challenging subjective practices under disparate impact, a
proving the business necessity of subjective practice was not unduly onerous, as such a
burden was commensurate with the plaintiff's task in proving her prima facie case;
furthermore, the employer, rather than the plaintiff, was in a unique position as the
party most knowledgeable concerning the purposes and effects of its selection practices).
8' Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
87 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
88 Such fears of an employer's burden were raised by the Fifth Circuit in Pouncy
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 800-01 (5th Cir. 1982). The court would "not
permit a plaintiff to challenge an entire range of employment practices merely because
the employer's work force reflects a racial imbalance that might be causally related to
any one or more of several practices . . . ." Id. at 801. Instead, the plaintiff was re-
quired to provide "proof that a specific practice results in a discriminatory impact...
in order to allocate fairly the parties' respective burdens of proof at trial." Id. at 800.
This added burden on the plaintiff was justified because it was unfair to place on the
defendant "the dual burden of articulating which of its employment practices cause the
adverse impact at issue and proving the business necessity of the practice." Id. Similar
concerns prompted the Ninth Circuit in Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1477, to require the plain-
tiff to "identify specific employment practices or selection criteria" as part of the three
elements composing a prima facie case under disparate impact. Id. at 1482.
Some have argued that this identification requirement is unnecessary. See, e.g.,
Rigler, supra note 31, at 35-36 (arguing that an employer will not find itself in the
unfavorable position of defending its entire selection system once a prima facie case is
established because the employer controls what practice or practices to identify as the
cause of the disparity); Commenit, supra note 72, at 974-76 (suggesting that the burden
on the employer would not be unfair; the employer would not have to isolate the effects
of specific practices as long as it proved that all the criteria met the business necessity
test).
88 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
80 See Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788-91.
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"plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment practice
that is challenged."'" She acknowledged that such identification may
"sometimes be more difficult" when subjective, rather than objective,
selection criteria are at issue.92 Once this task has been accomplished,
the plaintiff must establish causation by offering "statistical evidence
• ..sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the ex-
clusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their member-
ship in a protected group."93
The second constraint concerns the nature of an employer's rebut-
tal burden, thus addressing the Court's fear that scrutinizing subjective
criteria under disparate impact analysis would provide employers with
an incentive to institute quotas. After reemphasizing that the employer
has "'the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a
manifest relationship to the employment in question,' " the plurality
unexpectedly reduces the employer's burden from one of persuasion to
one of production:
Although we have said that an employer has "the burden of
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest
relationship to the employment in question," such a formula-
tion should not be interpreted as implying that the ultimate
burden of proof can be shifted to the defendant. On the con-
trary, the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination
against a protected group has been caused by a specific em-
ployment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times.
Thus, when the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of
disparate impact, and when the defendant has met its burden
of producing evidence that its employment practices are
based on legitimate business reasons, the plaintiff must
"show that other tests or selection devices, without a simi-
larly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the em-
ployer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy work-
manship." "
Justice O'Connor's explanation of the evidence required to meet
this lighter burden further weakened the employer's rebuttal obligation.
It provided that employers need not formally validate subjective criteria
in order to demonstrate their ability to predict on-the-job performance;
91 Id. at 2788.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2788-89.
11 Id. at 2790 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
95 Id. at 2790 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432, and Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)) (citations omitted).
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they only need demonstrate a manifest relationship between the criteria
and the legitimate goals of the employer.9" Justice O'Connor further
noted that "[i]n the context of subjective or discretionary employment
decisions, the employer will often find it easier than in the case of stan-
dardized tests to produce evidence of a 'manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question.' "I' Furthermore, "[i]t is self-evident that many
jobs, for example those involving managerial responsibilities, require
personal qualities that have never been considered amenable to stan-
dardized testing."98 Finally, the plurality also warned that " '[c]ourts
are generally less competent than employers to restructure business
practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not
attempt it.' "91
Watson's extension of the scope of disparate impact is in principle
a significant victory for plaintiffs in Title VII cases. Commentators
agree, however, that the opinion raises more questions than it an-
swers.' This is due in large part to the lack of a proper foundation for
the Court's ruling. The opinion did not explain adequately, for exam-
ple, why subjective criteria that are alleged to be discriminatory should
be analyzed under the disparate impact rather than the disparate treat-
ment approach. Furthermore, since the plurality's restructuring of the
98 See id. Among other examples, the Court quoted New York Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979), in which the Court "considered it obvious that
'legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency' permitted the exclusion of metha-
done users from employment with the New York City Transit Authority." Watson,
108 S. Ct. at 2790-91.
This argument is rather confusing. First, it establishes a standard that seems well-
nigh identical to the Court's recharacterization of the employer's burden. See supra
notes 94-95 and accompanying text. Second, the Court recasts the evidentiary burdens
largely as a response to the dangers of requiring validation studies for subjective crite-
ria. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. The Court seems to undercut this
rationale when it states that formal validations of subjective criteria really are not re-
quired anyway.
9 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2791 (quoting Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31).
98 Id. This almost could be read as suggesting that employment decisions in some
occupations so obviously require consideration of subjective criteria that their use will
be considered per se valid. Decisions involving even the most discretionary positions,
however, could be based on irrelevant subjective criteria.
" Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) (re-
quiring only a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the "grapevine" hiring of
bricklayers)). Taken in context, however, the Court presumably meant only that it
must refrain from dictating to employers how their decision-making systems should be
structured. It should not affect a relinquishment of the court's ability to determine
whether practices already in place violate the law.
'00 See, e.g., Powers, Not the Last Word: Court Leaves Key Bias Issues for An-
other Day, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 8, 1988, at 15, col. 1 (noting the lack of a majority
position on critical burden of proof questions); Impact of Supreme Court's Watson
Ruling will Hinge on Disparate Impact Interpretation, 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
at C-1, C-4, C-5 (July 12, 1988) (discussing seven questions raised by Justice
O'Connor's opinion).
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evidentiary burdens could well be adopted by a majority of the Court,
the rationale, implications, and failings of the decision must be
understood.
III. WHY DISPARATE IMPACT Is APPROPRIATE: PROVIDING THE
MISSING PIECES
This section will attempt to provide the theoretical framework,
lacking in Watson,1' 1 for applying disparate impact analysis to subjec-
tive employment decisions. The potential for discrimination inherent in
the use of subjective criteria will be analyzed, as will the characteristics
of the disparate treatment model which make it unsuitable for scruti-
nizing these criteria. Finally, those attributes of disparate impact theory
that render it better equipped for such a task are discussed.
A. Subjective Criteria as a Vehicle for Discrimination
Subjective practices are not per se discriminatory. 0 2 They are,
however, vulnerable to abuse. Discrimination through subjective crite-
ria discrimination is seldom manifested objectively in standards that can
be quantified and evaluated,"0 3 but difficulty in detection should not
deter investigation into the potential of these practices as a vehicle for
both intentional and unintentional employment discrimination.
As the Court cursorily acknowledged in Watson,104 subjective em-
101 See supra notes 44-100 and accompanying text.
102 See Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 338 (4th Cir. 1983)
("[B]ecause Title VII ... prohibit[s] racial discrimination rather than simple arbitrar-
iness or caprice, the mere existence of vague and subjective criteria is not alone proof of
unlawful discrimination"), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984); Hester v. Southern Ry.
Co., 497 F.2d. 1374, 1381 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Title VII comes into play only when
[subjective criteria] result in discrimination,"); supra note 77 and accompanying text.
Indeed, the necessary and legitimate use of subjective practices in certain employment
situations argues against a blanket prohibition. See Rogers v. International Paper Co.,
510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir.) ("[Subjective criteria] are not to be condemned as un-
lawful per se, for in all fairness to applicants and employers alike, decisions about
hiring and promotion in supervisory and managerial jobs cannot realistically be made
using objective standards alone."), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S.
809 (1975). Courts have been highly tolerant of the use of subjective criteria involving
upper level positions. See Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1984)
(citing the unusual aspects of tenure decisions, such as their lifetime nature); Bartholet,
Application of Title VII to jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 949 (1982)
("The courts have tended to show far greater deference to upper than to lower level
employers . . ").
101 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
104 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2786 (1988) ("It
does not follow . . . that the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is delegated
always act without discriminatory intent.").
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ployment criteria can be a vehicle for intentional discrimination.'0 5 Of
greater concern, though, is the potential for unfairness even when the
subjective decisionmaker lacks any discriminatory animus. In such situ-
ations, a subjective criterion such as a preliminary interview can oper-
ate as a "built-in headwind" just as the diploma and testing require-
ments did in Griggs."'0 For instance, the decisionmaker could be
unwittingly relying on subjective assessments by supervisors who were
influenced by conscious, yet covert, discrimination. 0 7 There is also the
problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices, "a lingering form
of the problem that Title VII was enacted to combat."' 0 8 When in-
fected with such attitudes, subjective employment decisions present the
most elusive, yet potentially the most insidious, echo of formerly overt
discrimination. The threat posed by hidden or subconscious stereotypes
and prejudices is compounded by the tendency of people to identify
more strongly with others most like them. Decisionmakers possess a
"bias toward the familiar" that is distinct from and perhaps less repre-
hensible than the foregoing stereotypes and prejudices because it is
grounded in a sense of identification rather than aversion.' Not sur-
prisingly, this more subtle discrimination is harder to detect and
prove." 0
Fears of unconscious, unintentional discrimination are not chimer-
ical; indeed, they coincide with the evolving pattern of discrimination,
which has changed from overt to more subtle forms, including subcon-
scious stereotypes and prejudices."' Legal approaches have been al-
.0. For instance, a supervisor relying solely on subjective criteria could continually
overlook minority candidates for promotion. Such extreme conduct could be regarded as
evidence of an intent to discriminate.
108 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); see supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972)
(stating that "promotion/transfer procedures which depend almost entirely upon the
subjective evaluation and favorable recommendation of the immediate foreman are a
ready mechanism for discrimination against Blacks, much of which can be covertly
concealed and, for that matter, not really known to management").
1 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786; see also R. FEAR & J. Ross, JoBs, DOLLARS,
AND EEO: How TO HIRE MORE PRODUCTIVE ENTRY-LEVEL WORKERS 18 (1983)
("We are all . . . the sum total of our inherited factors plus all the influences that have
been brought to bear upon us since birth. . . . [If our parents had certain prejudices,
such prejudices may very well have rubbed off on us, quite probably without our
knowledge or awareness.").
108 See Blumrosen, supra note 36, at 18-19.
110 See, e.g., Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984
and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 686 (1985) ("Both at the individual and institu-
tional levels, racism is typically far more subtle, indirect, and ostensibly nonracial now
than it was in 1964 . . . . Consequently, detection and remedy have become more
difficult.").
"' Congress has recognized this phenomenon. In explaining the rationale behind
the expansion of EEOC enforcement power in the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the
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tered accordingly."'
B. The Inadequacy of Disparate Treatment
Given that subjective employment practices have the potential to per-
petuate discrimination, they should be examined closely. Disparate
treatment, however, is not the proper vehicle for such an investigation.
This is true even when subjective criteria are used to further inten-
tional discrimination," 3 because in such situations the evidentiary stan-
dards associated with disparate treatment are inappropriate. First, once
an employer successfully rebuts the presumption raised by a prima fa-
cie case under disparate treatment, the evidence required by the plain-
House Report noted:
Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far more com-
plex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject [now]
generally describe the problem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather
than simply intentional wrongs . . . . The forms and incidents of discrim-
ination which the Commission is required to treat are increasingly
complex.
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
ACT OF 1972, H.R. REP. No. 93-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2144; see also Pettigrew, supra note 110, at 686-
701 (citing six features which characterize modern anti-black prejudice: (1) rejection of
gross stereotypes and blatant discrimination; (2) normative compliance without inter-
nalization of new behavioral norms of racial acceptance; (3) emotional ambivalence
toward black people that stems from early childhood socialization and a sense that
blacks currently are violating traditional American values; (4) indirect "micro-aggres-
sions" against blacks which is expressed in avoidance of face-to-face interaction with
blacks and opposition to racial change for ostensibly non-racial reasons; (5) a sense of
subjective threat from racial change; (6) individualistic conceptions of how opportunity
and social stratification operate in American society).
112 The approach that dominated anti-discrimination law for most of the first dec-
ade following the enactment of Title VII was the Model of Individual Justice, predi-
cated on the belief that intentionally discriminatory decisionmaking should be prohib-
ited, as race is almost never a factor in job performance. See Fallon & Weiler, supra
note 8, at 13. The practical limitations of a model that was restricted in scope to the
compensation of victims of specific acts of intentional discrimination soon became
evident:
[A]Iso troublesome is the Model of Individual Justice's definition of dis-
crimination: the problem may not be racial animus but racial effect; not
intent to exclude individuals but practices that keep out blacks as a group;
not willful decisions but continued application of criteria, often unjustified
by business needs, that have a racially differential impact.
Id. at 18. By contrast, the Model of Group Justice recognizes that "current talents and
abilities correlate closely with educational and cultural background," and that "the lone
individual does not stand independent of history as he or she confronts the meritocratic
world." Id. Thus, this model defines discrimination more broadly in terms of patterns
and effects rather than intent, and is better suited to the challenges presented by unin-
tentionally discriminatory selection practices. See id. at 19.
"I See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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tiff to establish employer pretext" 4 is either nonexistent, because the
impressions and opinions that constitute subjective decisions are seldom
recorded,11 5 or existent yet not readily available to the plaintiff."' Sec-
ond, the rebuttal burden requiring the defendant employer to offer a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision may be satisfied
too easily. For example, an employer might respond to a prima facie
case by vaguely claiming that the candidate for promotion was rejected
because she could not get along well with others or because the em-
ployee selected was the best qualified. Since the employer's burden
under disparate treatment is only one of production rather than persua-
sion," any subjective reason offered which appears legitimate likely
will be sufficient to move the inquiry to the pretext stage, where the
plaintiff continues to bear the burden of proof."' Thus, even when
subjective criteria discrimination is intentional, disparate treatment
analysis poses unfair obstacles for plaintiffs.
Subjective decisions, however, also permit unconscious discrimina-
tion, which, because it is unintentional, is not covered under disparate
treatment analysis by definition. Some commentators do not recognize
this problem because they seem mistakenly equate to bias with in-
tent."' In this regard, disparate treatment generally is out of date; it is
114 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
... This is inconsistent with the requirement in the Uniform Guidelines, supra
note 24, § 1607.4(A), that "[elach [employer] should maintain and have available for
inspection records or other information which will disclose the impact which its tests
and other selection procedures have upon employment opportunities of persons by iden-
tifiable race, sex, or ethnic group ... .
118 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45
(1977) (recognizing that superior access to evidence justifies shifting the burden of
proof in pattern and practice cases to the employer); see also Rose, Subjective Employ-
ment Practices: Does the Discriminatory Impact Analysis Apply?, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 63, 91-92 (1988) (discussing the difficulties that arise when data showing the
adverse impact of subjective procedures is unavailable).
" See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
118 Watson presented such a situation. The Bank's "shifting use of vague and
subjective criteria" frustrated the plaintiff's attempt to show pretext, as did the Bank's
testimony that fifty or one hundred criteria were used in making promotion decisions.
Brief for Petitioner at 6, 43-44, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777
(1988) (No. 86-6139); see also Bartholet, supra note 102, at 976 (claiming that in
upper-level employment cases such as those involving tenure decisions, the courts "sim-
ply assert that subjective decisionmaking is appropriate," thus placing a very slight
burden on the defendant); Comment, supra note 30, at 404-06 (stating that the defend-
ant "need not convince the court that its [subjective] reason is true" in order to move
the case to the pretext stage).
110 See, e.g., Note, supra note 84, at 549 (arguing that an assessment of the dis-
criminatory application of subjective evaluations requires an inquiry into intent, which
is properly done under disparate treatment). A similar error is made by those who
argue that hidden prejudice or bias is irrelevant; since subjective criteria are facially
neutral, they are amenable to disparate impact analysis. See Rigler, supra note 31, at
27, 44-46 (arguing that there is no basis for distinguishing between subjective and ob-
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premised on the overt discrimination of the 1960s and the Model of
Individual Justice that was the response.1 20
C. The Suitability of Disparate Impact Analysis
The weaknesses associated with using disparate treatment to ana-
lyze subjective employment practices are remedied by applying the dis-
parate impact standard. First, disparate impact imposes reasonable evi-
dentiary standards. Under disparate impact the focus is not on the
intent behind specific instances of discrimination, but on the outcome of
aggregated instances of subjective decision-making. Consequently, a
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case under this standard by dem-
onstrating that as a result of an at least partially subjective decision-
making process, a significant number of persons in a protected class
were rejected for employment.121 If the plaintiff establishes a prima fa-
cie case, the employer then has the burden of showing that the use of a
challenged selection device was justified by business necessity. The bus-
iness necessity defense traditionally has required more than merely
demonstrating the legitimacy of a challenged practice.122 In addition,
under disparate impact analysis the employer's burden is one of per-
suasion rather than production, as opposed to the standardless rebuttal
associated with disparate treatment. 123 Consequently, under disparate
impact, the plaintiff would not be faced with an unduly substantial
burden at the pretext stage.
A second attraction of disparate impact analysis is its focus on the
process by which an employment decision is made and the specific cri-
teria used rather than on the motives behind the decision itself. This
attention to process not only simplifies evidentiary problems, it is also
desirable on policy grounds, as it can expose a subtler and perhaps
more insidious form of discrimination.
12 '
This outcome comports with the mandates of Griggs and Title
VII, which both aim to eliminate discriminatory effects, however
caused.125 This is shown not only by their language, but also by their
jective criteria and that failure to apply disparate impact to facially neutral selection
devices is inconsistent with Griggs and Title VII). This approach is flawed because a
focus on facial neutrality fails to look beyond the surface of selection criteria to the
characteristics of the subjective decision making process. The process allows undetect-
able prejudice to affect decisions and this argues for use of disparate impact analysis.
120 See supra note 112.
121 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 13 & 117-18 and accompanying text.
12 See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
12' There has been much debate among commentators over whether the legislative
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clear choice not to differentiate between types of discriminatory em-
ployment practices. Nowhere in Griggs did the Court explicitly distin-
guish subjective and objective employment criteria; instead, Chief Jus-
tice Burger indicated the Court's resolve to combat discriminatory
effects, whatever their source. 2 ' The Court's declaration that "good in-
tent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms"127 may be interpreted to mean that
any employment practice, be it subjective or objective, will violate Title
VII if it works to exclude a significant number of minority group mem-
bers. Moreover, Title VII 128 and the Uniform Guidelines 2 9 do not dis-
intent behind Title VII encompasses disparate impact. Compare Blumrosen, Griggs
Was Correctly Decided-A Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 443, 443-52 (1986)
(adoption of adverse impact was an enlightened move which furthered the congressional
aim of enhancing employment opportunity for minority groups and women) and Hel-
fand & Pemberton, The Continuing Vitality of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis,
36 MERCER L. REv. 939, 941-62 (1985) (the statutory language of the original Civil
Rights Act and the legislative history of the 1972 amendments support the disparate
impact principle) and Thompson, The Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intent
in 1972-A Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 105, 105-06 (1986) ("Congress
approved the disparate impact theory and ratified Griggs when it amended Title VII in
1972. . . .") with Gold, supra note 25, at 564-78 (Congress did not adopt the adverse
impact theory established in Griggs) and Gold, Reply to Thompson, 8 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 117, 117 (1986) (same).
128 Nothing in Griggs suggests that the Court intended to limit disparate impact
cases to only those involving objective criteria. The Court instead chose to describe
employment practices broadly: "Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or mea-
suring procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving
these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasona-
ble measure of job performance." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 424 (1971)
(emphasis added).
127 Id. at 432.
128 As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the
language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportu-
nities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an iden-
tifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act,
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 429-30.
129 See Uniform Guidelines, supra note 24, § 1607.16(Q) ("selection procedure"
includes "the full range of assessment techniques from traditional paper and pencil
tests, performance tests, training programs, or probationary periods and physical, edu-
cational, and work experience requirements through informal or casual interviews and
unscored application forms"). The EEOC expanded on the Guidelines by stating that
the regulations applied not only to written tests, but to "all selection procedures used to
make employment decisions, including interviews, review of experience or education
from application forms, work samples, physical requirements, and evaluations of per-
formance." Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common
Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed.
Reg. 11,996, 11,997 (1979).
The Guidelines have been accorded substantial weight by the Court in interpret-
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tinguish between objective and subjective criteria. Rather, they empha-
size the consequences of selection practices, with a broader purpose of
eliminating employment criteria that operate as "artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment"130 for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability.
IV. THE Watson Plurality's Solution
The plurality's structuring of the evidentiary burdens departs sub-
stantially from that of traditional disparate impact analysis in two criti-
cal ways. First, the plurality's approach makes it more difficult for the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, the
plurality makes it markedly easier for the employer to defend such an
allegation. These new obstacles, in turn, may frustrate the purposes of
Title VII by deterring subjective criteria suits. Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor's allocation of the evidentiary burdens may represent at least
a partial collapsing of the disparate impact and disparate treatment
tests into the same analysis.
A. Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case
In addition to demonstrating that an employer's selection system
chooses applicants from protected groups for hire or promotion in a
"pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants,"' 31 a
plaintiff in a subjective practice case "must begin by identifying the
specific employment practice that is challenged."', 2 This new require-
ment was inserted to deter "cumulative effects" complaints which alleg-
edly force an employer to defend its entire system of employment prac-
tices."' The plurality shed little light on what constitutes identification
of a practice.' 4 If identification is intended to focus the inquiry and
ing Section 703(h) of the Act. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273, 279 (1976) (holding that EEOC's interpretations are "entitled to great defer-
ence"); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34 ("The administrative interpretation of the Act by
the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference. Since the Act and its legislative
history support the Commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the
guidelines as expressing the will of Congress." (citations omitted)).
130 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
... Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see supra notes 20-
22 and accompanying text.
132 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2788 (1988); see supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
13 It would be unduly harsh to read the plurality's use of "practice" in the singu-
lar, see Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788, Constraining a plaintiff who has a legitimate basis
for attributing a disparity to more than one criterion. One can envision a situation in
which there are two subjective practices, such as a performance rating by a supervisor
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thereby avoid overbroad attacks, this could be accomplished by simply
having the plaintiff state what she believes to be the offending practice.
The plaintiff should not, however, simply identify the allegedly dis-
criminatory criterion, but she also should provide some evidentiary sup-
port for her claim.1" 5
There are two difficulties presented by the identification require-
ment. An employer's decision-making process may be so amorphous as
to render identification impossible.13 Strict enforcement of the identifi-
cation requirement could provide employers with an incentive to make
their decision making process deliberately vague. "' A second potential
problem concerns the unfairness of requiring an unsuccessful applicant
for employment to understand the employer's decision-making process
sufficiently to pinpoint the criterion that was responsible for the alleged
discrimination. Furthermore, the statistical evidence detailing the effects
of the criterion are unlikely to have ever been available to the
plaintiff."'8
Not only did the plurality add an identification element to what a
plaintiff must prove as part of her prima facie case, it also reduced the
effect of the prime facie showing once it is made. This latter alteration
follows deductively from the refashioning of the employer's rebuttal ob-
ligation. The reduced burden now shouldered by the defendant indi-
cates that the plurality views the prime facie case merely as raising an
inference of discrimination, reminiscent of the easily rebuttable pre-
and an interview, which work together to produce a significant adverse impact. Cf
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26 (involving two objective practices, the requirement of high
school education and the administration of standardized intelligence tests). Permitting
the plaintiff to challenge only one of these devices would be counterproductive. Even if
a plaintiff were to challenge successfully one practice, under such a narrow reading an
employer in theory would be able to continue using the second device until it too was
attacked.
18 Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff establishes a significant disparity in the
employer's workforce and attributes this to an interview required of all applicants for
employment. The defendant then would rebut this showing either by arguing that the
identified practice does not result in a disparity or that there is a legitimate business
reason for the disparity. Should the defendant choose the former approach, the plaintiff
would have to introduce further and more convincing evidence of a disparity if she is to
meet the burden of persuasion.
... This situation is particularly likely to arise in challenges to the selection sys-
tems of small businesses, such as Fort Worth Bank & Trust, or closely-held firms
whose size and informality are not conducive to highly formalized decision making
systems.
'37 Justice Blackmun appreciated this danger and cautioned that the identification
requirement cannot be used "to shield from liability an employer whose selection pro-
cess is so poorly defined that no specific criterion can be identified with any certainty,
let alone be connected to the disparate effect." Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2797 n.10 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
18 See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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sumption created under disparate treatment analysis, rather than actu-
ally constituting proof of discrimination.
B. The Employer's Rebuttal Burden
Once the plaintiff's prima facie claim of discrimination has been
established, the defendant in a traditional disparate impact case is
charged with "the burden of showing that any given requirement [has]
a manifest relationship to the employment in question."1 9 Prior to
Watson, the Court previously had placed upon the employer the bur-
den of proving, not merely explaining, that a particular practice is war-
ranted as a business necessity.140 In Watson, however, the Court sur-
prisingly and without adequate explanation recast this rebuttal burden,
at least insofar as subjective criteria cases are concerned. It first reduced
the employer's burden from one of persuasion to one of producing evi-
dence that its employment practices are based on legitimate business
reasons,141 a standard that is considerably easier to meet. It then rather
confusingly stated that in order to meet that burden, employers need
not formally validate their objective criteria, they need only establish
that the criteria serve legitimate goals.
142
The problem with this restructured rebuttal burden is that the
Court, in effect, threw the baby out with the bath water. The Court
attempted to prevent what it saw as unfortunate secondary effects from
the application of disparate impact analysis to subjective criteria, x43 but
in the process constrained Title VII plaintiffs to an extent unwarranted
by the foreseeable dangers.
C. Plaintiffs Burden of Proof
Once an employer has responded to a prima facie case by meeting
its burden of production, the plaintiff must persuade the court that
there is an alternative selection device which would not have as adverse
an impact and still would serve the needs of the employer. 44 In out-
ward appearance, this is the same standard as applied in conventional
disparate impact cases. Due to the changed nature of the employer's
burden as formulated in Watson, however, the requirement of proving
a less injurious alternative effectively shifts the business necessity bur-
G3 riggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
140 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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den to the third stage of the analysis, and hence to the plaintiff. In
order to prevail, the plaintiff in a subjective criteria case first must de-
vise an alternative selection practice, and then validate it. It is not clear
why the plurality assumed that plaintiffs know which available systems
are appropriate for the defendant's business. 145 Yet even if the plaintiff
were to accomplish this task, the employer still could prevail if it raised
legitimate considerations, such as the "cost or other burdens of pro-
posed alternative selection devices" '146 which would indicate that the
proposed solution did not meet the employer's needs.
In sum, the plurality's restructuring of the order and allocation of
proof has the following effects: (1) it adds an element to the traditional
concept of the prima facie disparate impact case and reduces the benefit
to the plaintiff from such a showing; (2) it substantially lessens both the
nature and content of the defendant's rebuttal burden; (3) it markedly
increases the burden on the plaintiff at the pretext stage. Quite possi-
bly, then, the plurality's position in Watson, if adopted by a majority of
the Court, could operate as a "built-in headwind" 41 for plaintiffs in
subjective criteria cases.
D. The Threat to Disparate Impact Analysis
A further disturbing aspect of Watson is the plurality's suggestion
that the new evidentiary standards extend to all disparate impact cases,
both subjective and objective. 4 If so, this would indicate that at least a
partial collapse of the disparate impact and disparate treatment models
has occurred, one which would frustrate the independent bases support-
ing impact analysis. 49 This is suggested both by the way the plurality's
burden allocation closely resembles that used in disparate treatment
cases and by the underlying rationale which the Court seems to have
145 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
146 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988). One
example of "other burdens" might be the difficulty in implementing the proposed
alternative.
147 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
148 See, e.g., Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788 n.2 ("[W]e do not believe that each
verbal formulation used in prior opinions to describe the evidentiary standards in dispa-
rate impact cases is automatically applicable in light of today's decision."); id. at 2788
("Our previous decisions offer guidance, but today's extension of disparate impact anal-
ysis calls for a fresh and somewhat closer examination of the constraints that operate to
keep that analysis within its proper bounds." (footnote omitted)). But cf id. at 2786
("[W]e must determine whether . . . disparate impact analysis . . . can be applied in
this new context under workable evidentiary standards.").
149 See The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. Ruv.
143, 308-20 (1988) (discussing Watson and asserting that the division over the eviden-
tiary burdens may indicate that the Court is reconsidering the theoretical underpin-
nings of disparate impact).
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adopted for disparate impact analysis.
It bears repeating that disparate treatment analysis focuses exclu-
sively on the intent of the decisionmaker while disparate impact analy-
sis focuses on the effect an employment practice has on a protected
group.150 Under disparate treatment analysis, a prima facie case raises
a presumption of illicit intent since it is presumed that discrimination is
the only plausible explanation. A prima facie case under the disparate
impact approach means that a discriminatory effect has been proven
directly, largely by statistical evidence. With regard to the employer's
rebuttal, only the burden of production shifts under the disparate treat-
ment standard, while under the traditional disparate impact standard
the burden of persuasion also shifts. Finally, as to the degree of evi-
dence necessary to rebut a prima facie case, the employer in a disparate
treatment case only need explain the differential treatment; under
traditional disparate impact analysis the employer must prove business
necessity.
As Justice Blackmun explains in his concurrence, "[t]he plurality's
suggested allocation of burdens [for subjective criteria cases] bears a
closer resemblance to the allocation of burdens we established for dispa-
rate-treatment claims.' 15' The plurality's restructuring is indeed "a
near-perfect echo" of the Court's disparate treatment opinions.15 2 The
ultimate burden of proof remains with the plaintiff whose prima facie
case raises only an inference of discrimination, while the defendant's
burden is one of mere production and may be met by offering facially
legitimate business reasons.
Watson's restructuring of the evidentiary burdens also undermines
the theoretical underpinnings of traditional disparate impact analy-
sis. 15' Elements of the plurality's ruling indicate that it has adopted a
proxy theory which effectively views the establishment of adverse im-
pact merely as a surrogate method for proving intentional discrimina-
tion.15  According to this theory, if a test, interview, or experience re-
15 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
151 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
152 Id. Compare, for example, Justice O'Connor's statement regarding the "ulti-
mate burden of proof," see supra text accompanying note 95, with Justice Powell's
view that under disparate treatment, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981) (citations omitted).
151 See supra note 8-9 and accompanying text.
154 The disparate impact theory has been described as the "weak" version of the
Model of Group Justice, see Fallon & Weiler, supra note 8, at 20, merely supplement-
ing the Model of Individual Justice, because "discriminatory impact has its moral and
theoretical force as evidence of intentional, race-based decision-making." Id.
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quirement is shown to exclude large numbers of a protected group,
then the practice itself has become a "proxy" for race, gender, or any
other impermissible factor. The statistically significantly adverse impact
of the practice indicates McDonnell Douglas discriminatory intent.15
Recharacterizing the effect of the plaintiffs prime facie showing in this
manner allows the plurality, for evidentiary purposes, to treat the case
as one of disparate treatment. Consequently, the demonstrated effect of
a neutral practice raises only an inference of discrimination and shifts
the burden of production, rather than persuasion, to the defendant. The
end result is a circumvention of the more favorable burden allocation
afforded to plaintiffs under the disparate impact standard.
Fearing that the unanimous decision to apply disparate impact to
subjective selection practices strayed too far from the realm of intent,
the Watson plurality imposed constraints to keep the analysis within its
proper bounds, appearing to take with one hand what had just been
given with the other.156 The Court's attachment to intent, under the
proposed burden allocation system, is likely sharply to limit the utility
of disparate impact as a basis for Title VII claims. Thus, the bold step
the Court has taken in applying impact analysis to subjective employ-
ment practices ultimately may make little headway toward eradicating
modern forms of discrimination.
V. TAILORING THE MEANS TO FIT THE END: AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH TO SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA EVIDENTIARY BURDENS
The Watson plurality's decision to apply disparate impact to sub-
jective employment decisions was correct.'15 The court was insuffi-
ciently flexible, however, in devising appropriate evidentiary burdens.
This section suggests an alternative approach by accepting some of the
plurality's requirements, modifying others, and rejecting those that ulti-
mately lead to the merger of the two theories of Title VII
discrimination.
First, the threat of broad cumulative effects complaints... is suffi-
cient to warrant the requirement that the plaintiff, as part of her prima
155 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
156 See Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788-91 (requiring plaintiff to identify the specific
employment practice challenged, to prove a causal relationship between the practice
and plaintiff's exclusion, to offer reliable statistical evidence, to bear the burden of per-
suasion at all times, and not requiring defendants to introduce "validation studies"
showing that particular criteria predict job performance).
157 See supra notes 113-30 and accompanying text (arguing that disparate impact
analysis permits plaintiffs to overcome obstacles in proving discrimination that are in-
surmountable under disparate treatment analysis).
1'8 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 137:1755
WHEN DOCTRINES COLLIDE
facie case, identify the employer's practice or practices that she believes
in good faith are responsible for the disparity.159 A plaintiff's ignorance
of an employer's procedures and her lack of access to data160 would be
cured largely by discovery. To the extent, however, that such informa-
tion is unavailable because the employer failed to comply with EEOC
record-keeping requirements, 61 the burden of defending its entire sys-
tem should rightfully be borne by the employer. The employer also
should bear this burden when its decision- making system is too vague
or incoherent for the plaintiff to isolate a culpable component.' 62
Commensurate with the increased responsibility of the plaintiff,
the employer's rebuttal burden in subjective criteria cases should be the
same as that imposed under traditional disparate impact analysis.'63 An
employer should be required to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by
offering statistical evidence that is more accurate or relevant, or by per-
suading the court of the business necessity of its subjective practice.
The Supreme Court has described the business necessity requirement
in a number of ways 6 and it is not the purpose of this Comment to
offer a precise definition. It is sufficient to say that an employer should
be required to do more when rebutting a prima facie case than simply
to provide a legitimate business reason for a subjective practice.'
6 5
Strengthening the employer's burden of persuasion will not lead,
as the plurality feared, to the wholesale adoption of quota systems. It
must be acknowledged that the use of subjective criteria in employment
decisions is warranted, particularly when the job in question possesses
a significant discretionary component. Given employers' legitimate
159 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
181 See supra note 115. The importance of compliance with these requirements is
demonstrated by the Uniform Guidelines' provision specifying that where an employer
has failed to maintain data on adverse impact, federal enforcement agencies are permit-
ted to draw an inference of adverse impact in the selection process. See Uniform Guide-
lines, supra note 24, § 1607.4(D); see also Rose, supra note 116, at 92 (for jobs where
subjective criteria serve as the sole basis for decisionmaking, an employer may satisfy its
burden by showing that the only procedures available for use in the decision were
discretionary and that the employer complied with the record keeping requirements of
the Uniform Guidelines).
162 Cf supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (requiring strict identification
of the challenged practice may encourage the use of vague decisionmaking processes).
613 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
18 In Griggs alone the Court refers to the employer's burden alternatively as
"business necessity," "related to job performance," and "manifest relationship to the
employment in question." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
'15 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2794 (1988)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement) ("The term [busi-
ness necessity] ... goes a long way toward establishing the limits of the defense: To be
justified as business necessity an employment criterion must bear more than an indirect
or minimal relationship to job performance." (citations omitted)).
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needs for subjective practices, it would be undesirable to force firms
into "objectifying" their selection systems. To the extent that the plu-
rality describes subjective criteria as "obvious," "plainly relevant," or
"self-evident," in order to caution against the wholesale abandonment
of subjective decisionmaking, its point is well taken. The context in
which these statements are made, however, creates a danger that they
will be read as reducing, or perhaps even eliminating, the scrutiny to
which the variety of subjective practices should be subjected. Reducing
such scrutiny avoids the evil of quotas at the expense of making little, if
any, headway against the discriminatory abuses inherent in discretion-
ary decision-making. Returning to the traditional disparate impact re-
buttal burden would permit a balancing of the employer's business in-
terests16  against those of the plaintiff (and society generally) in
eradicating discrimination.
Procedural considerations should play a part in assessing the va-
lidity of a subjective employment practice.' 67 The presence of proce-
dural safeguards can remedy a troubling aspect of subjective decision-
making, namely the lack of employer accountability, by giving protected
groups a voice in the decision-making process, 68 including an opportu-
nity to obtain review. Of equal importance, being able to demonstrate
the procedural integrity of its decision-making process would reduce the
pressure on an employer to use only objective criteria that can easily be
16 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981)
(Title VII was not intended to "diminish traditional management prerogatives").
167 For a comprehensive discussion of such considerations, see B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 202-05 (listing such factors as completing a job analysis,
providing raters with specific guidelines and establishing an appeal process or review-
ing committee); see also Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358-59 (5th
Cir. 1972) (considering five such factors-including heavy reliance on the recommenda-
tion of a foreman who was provided with no written instructions regarding the qualifi-
cations necessary for promotion, the use of vague and subjective standards, absence of
notice of promotion opportunities, and the lack of procedural safeguards-as important
to the determination that Title VII had been violated); Blumrosen, supra note 36, at
34-37 (discussing factors that appear to influence judicial decisions in subjective judg-
ment cases); Denis, Subjective Decision Making: Does It Have a Place in the Employ-
ment Process?, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 269, 282-87 (1986) (listing preventive mea-
sures to minimize risk of liability); cf. Waintroob, supra note 21, at 47-62 (discussing
the use of subjective criteria in white-collar cases and arguing that in this context courts
are more tolerant of subjective practices if the decision-making procedure is fair and
safeguarded).
The considerations of cost and "other burdens" proposed by the Watson plurality,
see supra note 146 and accompanying text, are too nebulous to be of any real assistance
to the inquiry.
168 Cf Royal v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 655 F.2d 159, 164 (8th
Cir. 1981) (subjective decisions should be scrutinized closely when the decisionmakers
are not members of a protected class).
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validated scientifically, thereby eliminating the attraction of quotas."6 9
The availability of procedural safeguards, a resource notably untapped
by the Watson plurality, argues against the need to reduce the em-
ployer's rebuttal burden to one of mere production.
In sum, a plaintiff challenging a subjective employment criterion
under Title VII should have to establish a prima facie case by identify-
ing, where possible, the culpable practice and demonstrating that it has
a statistically significant adverse effect on members of a protected class.
This prima facie case would be sufficient to prove that discrimination
actually had occurred, as under the traditional disparate impact stan-
dard.170 The employer, in turn, should bear the burden of persuasion
as to the business necessity of its practice, a burden which at least in
part may be met by proof that procedures were in place to guard
against abuse of discretion. Once this rebuttal burden is met, the plain-
tiff should have the opportunity, as under traditional disparate impact
analysis, to undercut the weight of the employer's alleged business ne-
cessity by alleging that the proffered justification is merely a pretext for
discrimination.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust" ' answered in the affirmative the important question of whether
disparate impact analysis may be used to mount a Title VII challenge
to employment decisions based wholly or partially on subjective judg-
ments. 17 2 The decision, however, created uncertainty as to whether Ti-
tle VII plaintiffs will reap the benefits of the Court's ruling." 3 The
uncertainty is at base due to the Court's failure to articulate properly
the differences between subjective and objective criteria, choosing to fo-
cus instead on the dichotomy between intentional discrimination and
unintentional practices having a discriminatory effect.' 7 ' While this fo-
cus ultimately leads the Court to the correct determination, it does so at
the expense of a proper foundation. The implications of this flaw are
manifested most vividly in the plurality's inappropriate allocation of the
evidentiary burdens among plaintiffs and employers in subjective crite-
169 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
170 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
171 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
172 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 131-55 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court's identifi-
cation requirements, its recasting of the employer's rebuttal burden, and its increasing
of the plaintiff's burden at the pretext stage).
17I See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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ria suits.'1 5 The result does more than just discourage plaintiff's from
pursuing their Title VII rights. It comes dangerously close to rendering
disparate impact analysis indistinguishable from disparate treatment,
thereby eliminating a much needed theory of recovery against modern
forms of discrimination.1
76
More fundamentally, there is an underlying tension in the Court's
analysis as to whether "discrimination" consists of limited opportunity
or whether it requires, albeit in a more subtle manner, evidence of il-
licit intent.'7 7 By indirectly clinging to the notion of intent embodied in
the proxy rationale, it would seem that the Supreme Court has not
recognized fully the subtle and manifold forms of current discrimina-
tion. This failure could be remedied by adopting this Comment's sug-
gestions for restructuring the evidentiary burdens in subjective criteria
cases. The resulting more balanced allocation between plaintiffs and
employers avoids the harms feared by the plurality, while at the same
time providing a way of policing the adverse impact of subjective crite-
ria. By enhancing the ability of minority group members to protect
their Title VII rights and by minimizing the intrusion into employers'
management prerogatives, the end result would be a closer observance
of the mandate of Title VII to "eliminate all aspects of
discrimination.'1
7 8
1 See supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
17 S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1964).
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